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ABORTION LAW - AN ENGLISH PERSPECTIVE*
ANDREW GRUBB**

Abortion is an issue that divides many societies-perhaps most societies.' It is certainly, in my experience in the United States, the most
divisive issue in American society today. 2 Acrimonious debate has ensued
in America. The pro-life and pro-choice groups postured while the nation
awaited the Webster3 decision earlier in the year. In the result, of course,
that case pleased no one-certainly not any of the Justices if you read
any of the opinions. 4 The pro-life group did not see the anticipated

demise of Roe v. Wade' in its totality, though it saw the gradual process
of demolition practiced by a group of the court on the trimester scheme
of Roe v. Wade.6 The pro-choice group, on the other hand, saw Roe

survive at least in principle, but saw a majority of the Justices sanction
yet more permissible state legislative restrictions on abortions. But as

Justice Blackmun put it in that case-and he wrote the Court's opinion

in Roe v. Wade-"[flor today at least, the law of abortion stands
undisturbed. For today, the women of this Nation still retain the liberty
to control their destinies."" The future may hold more fear, I think,

for the pro-choice movement in the United States when the Court
considers a number of abortion cases later this term.' At least one of
them involving an Illinois statute may lead a majority of the Court, I

An expanded version of this lecture appears in 18 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 146 (1990).
I am grateful to Rob Schwartz for his valuable comments on an earlier version of the lecture
and to Torild Kristiansen for her help in preparing the transparencies for the lecture.
* BA (Cantab); MA (Cantab); Barrister, Inner Temple. Centre of Medical Law and Ethics,
and Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Laws, King's College, London. Visiting Professor, University of
New Mexico School of Law, Fall 1989.
1. For a comparative law discussion see ABORTION AND PROTECrION OF THE HUMAN FETUS:
LEGAL. PROBLEMS IN A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE (S. Frankowski & G. Cole eds. 1987); M.
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
2. The Battle Over Abortion, NEWSWEEK, May 1, 1989, at 28-32; Whose Life Is It?, TIME,

May 1, 1989, at 20-24; Save The Babies, Timm, May 1, 1989, at 26-28.
3. Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
4. Webster is discussed in Baron, Abortion and Legal Process in the United States: An
Overview of the Post-Webster Legal Landscape, 17 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 368 (1989). See
also Kolbert, Introduction: Did the Amici Effort Make a Difference? 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 153
(1989). Several of the amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court are repcoduced at 15 AM.
J.L. & MED. 169 (1989).
5. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Only Justice Scalia would have overruled Roe. Webster, 109 S. Ct.
at 3064. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Kennedy would abandon the trimester
framework of Roe. Justice O'Connor would retain the framework, though she reached the same
conclusion to uphold the Missouri statute. Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens would uphold
Roe. See Baron, supra note 4.
6. For a discussion of the importance of Roe, see Note, The Evolution of the Right to
Privacy After Roe v. Wade, 13 Am. J.L. & MED. 365, 365-466 (1987).
7. Webster, 109 S. Ct. at 3079.
8. See Ragsdale v. Turnock, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988); Hodgson v. Minnesota. 827 F.2d
1191 (8th Cir. 1987), vacated 835 F.2d 1545 (1987), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
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think, including the procrastinating Justice O'Connor to demolish once
and for all the trimester scheme of Roe and perhaps even the right of
privacy in this context. 9 And it may even consign the fundamental right
recognized in Roe to the judicial garbage can, leaving the minority
Justices, with Justice Blackmun carrying the banner, with only the
rhetoric of a lost cause.' 0 Those skirmishes that we see in the United
States could be the visible skirmishes of the abortion battle and the
conflict over a woman's right to choose, or the existence of it, in any
western jurisdiction. Perhaps only the intensity of the debate and the
venue of battle would vary.
In the wake of Roe v. Wade the American battlefronts have been
mainly in the courts. A plethora of cases in the federal courts have
tested the constitutionality of legislation passed by state legislatures
restricting the availability of abortion." Webster is perhaps the most
significant of these in the last few years, but even this is not the last.
So central is the role of the American judiciary in dealing with abortion
issues, that the litmus test for nominations to the Supreme Court, and
indeed the lower federal courts under the Reagan administration, was
the candidate's views on abortion and his or her attitude towards a
woman's right to choose under the general constitutional umbrella of
a right of privacy."
In England, however, the controversy and battles rage with just as
much vigor, but the battle sites are quite different. England lacks an
American-style Bill of Rights, which endows your federal courts with
the power to strike down legislation. Our courts do not have that power.
As a consequence, the English courts have been much less involved in
resolving the conflicts between the pro-life and the pro-choice points
of view. In England today, the availability of abortion as a medical
procedure is a matter of statutory law. Parliament has defined the limits
of lawful abortions and it is there, in Parliament, that the showdowns
between pro-life and pro-choice minded Members of Parliament have
occurred when attempts have been made to amend the relatively liberal
abortion law which we have dating back to the Abortion Act 1967.11
That is not to say that the English judges have not had anything to
do with abortion. Because the pro-life point of view has been almost
completely unsuccessful in bringing about Parliamentary change in the
1967 Act, a number of cases have been brought in the courts in the

9. As it transpires, the appeal in Ragsdale was withdrawn after an agreement between the
parties. The oral hearing in Hodgson took place on December 4, 1989.
10. For a defense of Roe, see Robertson, Gestational Burdens and Fetal Status: Justifying
Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 189 (1987).
11. See Note, supra note 6.
12. See H. SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO REWRITE THE
CONSTITUTION (1988). The most famous example is, of course, the failed nomination of Robert
Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987. The Bork affair is discussed by E. BRONNER, JUSTICE FOR
AMERICA (1989). See also the main protagonist's own account in R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA (1989).
13. See J. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1988), at ch. 6.
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hope that the courts would introduce restrictions on the availability of
abortions."' But because English courts lack the power to strike down
the law, as expressed in legislation, because of our doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty-quite the opposite of the American position under
the Constitution-there have been no direct attacks on the Act, because
it cannot be done."
Instead, the judges can, indeed of course they should, interpret the
legislation and in doing so they may make both liberal and conservativeif those are the two positions you would like to identify-interpretations
of the legislation. Also, it is possible that they may graft on some
common law principles which do not conflict with the Act, such as the
issue of paternal rights in abortion decision-making, which is not dealt
with in our legislation.
There is little indication that the English judiciary relish the prospect
of resolving the issue-(or any issue of profound social and moral
importance)-the English judicial instinct is to consider such matters
the proper role of elected representatives in Parliament.' 6 The English
judiciary on the whole take a much narrower view of their role in
society than do their American counterparts.
So, let us look at the development of English Law. As with any
abortion law and in particular, the American law, the law has developed
in the background of competing interests. The common themes of the
primacy of maternal rights and paramountcy of fetal rights are part of
the English debate on abortion. An inevitable conflict between these
rights exists, whether the law permits abortion in some, or all circumstances, or prohibits them absolutely. '7 Some might seek to strike a
balance between the competing claims of mother and unborn child,
while others might resolve the problem by giving unassailable priority
to one set of claims. English law adopts the former and not the latter
approach. It seeks to strike a compromise permitting abortions on certain
specified grounds, up to a point where the fetus has matured sufficiently
for its interests to take overriding priority. As I will show, this point
in time seems to coincide with the point in time when the fetus becomes
viable.
However, even prior to this stage in fetal development, maternal rights
are not given absolute priority. Under the Abortion Act 1967, which
is the governing legislation, an abortion may only be performed if one
of the statutorily created grounds exists. On the face of it then, English
law does not match precisely the surviving trimester regime imposed by

14. Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory Service Trustees [1979] Q.B. 276; C v. S [19881 1
Q.B. 135; Royal College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v. Department of Health and Social
Security [1981] A.C. 800.
15. Pickin v. British Railways Board [1974] A.C. 765; Manuel v. Attorney General (19831
Ch. 77.
16. Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbeck Area Health Authority [1986] 1 A.C. 112, 194 per
Lord Bridge.
17. See generally M. GLENDON, supra note 1; R. GOLDSTEIN, MOTHER-LOVE AND ABORTION:
A LErOA INTERPRETATION (1988).
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the Supreme Court in Roev. Wade. While reaching the point of viability
is significant in both America and England, prior to that time, English
law restricts the availability of abortions. This contrasts with the American law most obviously during the first trimester. The existence of this
restriction, however, in England, may, as I will show, be one more of
form rather than substance, when the abortion is performed during the
first trimester.
In seeking to reach a compromise between maternal and fetal interests,
English law has moved through three phases of development. The first
phase might be described as the criminalization of abortion; the second
phase might be described as the acceptance of therapeutic abortion; and
the last one is the introduction of state regulation of therapeutic abortion
procedures. What can be seen in the development of the law is a gradual
increase in the law's restriction of abortion through the medium of the
criminal law, followed by a relaxation in that law when medical indications exist.
First, the early criminal law prohibited abortion of mature fetuses
when, in the old language of the 18th century judges, 'quickening' had
occurred."5 'Quickening' was a notion associated with the first time a
mother could feel her fetus move or stir within her womb.19 Secondly,
in the 19th century, the law was extended to protect all fetuses, regardless
of their stage of .development. Abortion became illegal regardless of
the stage of fetal development. 20 Thirdly, in the late 19th century and
perhaps more accurately in the early 20th century, the judges evolved,
as medicine progressed and became safer, the notion of the lawful

18. In 3 Co. Inst. 50, Sir Edward Coke stated abortion was "a great misprision, and no
murder." See also W. HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, vol. 2, bk. 1,ch.
31, § 16 (1716); M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 53 (1678); E. EAST, A TREATISE ON THE PLEAS
OF THE CROWN, vol. 1, at 227-30 (1803); W. RUSSELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS
485 (1857). But note the contrasting views in Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a
Penumbral or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise From the Nineteenth-Century Legislative
Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty, 17 N.Y. L.F. 335 (1971); and Gavigan,
The Criminal Sanction as it Relates to Human Reproduction: The Genesis of the Statutory
Prohibition of Abortion, 5 J. LEG. HIST. 20 (1984). The Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade was
sufficiently persuaded, inter alia, by Means' argument that Justice Blackmun said "it now appearis]
doubtful that abortion was ever firmly established as a common-law crime even with respect to
the destruction of a quick fetus." 410 U.S. 113, 136.
19. R v. Phillips, 3 Camp 76 (1811) (a case decided under Lord Ellenborough's Act of 1803)
and R v. Goldsmith, 3 Camp 73 (1811). Cf. R v. Wychereley, 8 C.& P. 262 (1838). Baron
Gurney directed a Jury of Matrons that a woman who had been convicted of murder would be
"quick with child" and so was entitled to a stay of execution if she had conceived.
20. The changes were statutory. Chronologically, the legislation began in 1803 with Lord
Ellenborough's Act. 43 Geo. III, ch. 58. Section I created an offense, inter alia, "unlawfully
to cause and procure the miscarriage of any women then being quick with child." Section 2
extended the criminal prohibition of abortion to the fetus prior to quickening (an offense "to
procure the miscarriage of any woman not being, or not being proved to be quick with child").
Section 1 created a capital offense, but offenses under section 2 were punishable by imprisonment,
whipping or transportation! Further amendments occurred in Lord Lansdowne's Act, 1828, 9
Geo. IV, ch. 31. Finally, in the Offences Against the Person Act 1837, a single offense "to
procure the miscarriage of any woman" was enacted removing the different offenses for the
"quick" and "non-quick" fetus. For a discussion of the statutory history, see B. DICKENS,
ABORTION AND THE LAW (1966) and J. KEOWN, ABORTION, DOCTORS AND THE LAW (1988).
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therapeutic abortion. 2 And finally, in 1967 we see the acceptance of
therapeutic abortions by Parliament and the introduction of state regulation of abortions. 22 English law gradually has accepted the medicalization of the abortion procedure.
Let us look at the framework of the law. We should start with the
criminalization of abortion because the law of abortion in England has
to be seen primarily in its criminal law context. The criminal law creates
the crime and it is the extent to which a doctor would have a defense
to that crime in carrying out a therapeutic abortion which defines the
scope of lawful abortion.
The Crimes
Section 58
Offences Against the
Person Act 1861
(procuring a miscarriage)

Conception

<

Viability

Implantation

Infant Life
(Preservation)
Act 1929
(child destruction)

-

->

Birth

(Figure 1)
If we look at Figure 1 we see that there are two criminal statutes
which are relevant. The first statutory provision is section 58 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 which provides that it is an
offense for a person "with intent to procure the miscarriage of any
[to] ... unlawfully
woman, whether she be or not with child ...
thing, or ... [to]
noxious
or
other
poison
...
any
her
to
administer
• . . unlawfully use any instrument or other mean whatsoever with the
like intent." This offense is the modern version of those created by
the earlier nineteenth century statutes dating back to 1803.23 Three
features of the offense are worthy of note. First, section 58 does not,
strictly speaking, prohibit and punish the performance of an abortion.
Instead, it is an offense to do one of the prohibited activities "with
intent to procure a miscarriage." The prohibition, in other words, seeks
to criminalize conduct which precedes the actual abortion or termination
of the pregnancy. Of course, if the latter does take place, an offense
under section 58 is still committed. Secondly, the prohibited act must
be done with the intent to procure a miscarriage. What precisely does
this statutory term mean? As figure 1 shows, probably the Act only

21. The leading case is R v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 687. See generally DICKENS, supra note
20, at ch. 2 and J. KEOWN, supra note 20, at ch. 2.
22. Abortion Act 1967.
23. See supra note 20.
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prohibits conduct intended to terminate a pregnancy if implantation has
taken place. Only then can it be said that the woman is "carrying"
and hence can a "miscarriage" be intended)" It follows that procedures
or medical devices such as post-coital birth control which act to prevent
implantation of a fertilized ovum or embryo are not prohibited by
section 58.5 Only if these also act to dislodge an implanted fertilized6
2
ovum or embryo, and this is intended, will any criminal liability arise.
Thirdly, it is irrelevant whether the woman is in fact pregnant or,
as the Act rather quaintly puts it, "with child." Acting with the intent
to procure a miscarriage is sufficient. If, however, it is the woman
herself who is alleged to have acted to procure her own miscarriage,
the Act specifically requires that she be pregnant, again "with child,"
in order to commit the offense. On the face of it the policy behind
section 58 seems to be twofold: the protection of the mother from
dangerous abortions and also the protection of the life of the fetus
itself. When a third party is not involved, but only the mother, then
the statute is not intended to protect her from herself, hence the need
for her to be "with child."
That, then, is the first of the statutory provisions creating a criminal
offense in relation to abortion. There is also another relevant offense,
that of child destruction, which is created by the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929. Section 1(1) provides "any person who, with intent
to destroy the life of a child capable of being born alive, by any
unlawful act causes a child to die before it has an existence independent
of its mother, shall be guilty of ... child destruction." This section
was actually designed by the people who originally introduced it into
the Parliament to criminalize killing at the point of a birth because a
child who was killed in the process of birth under the English law was
not protected by the criminal law. 27 It was not murder because the child
was not born,2 8 and it was not procuring a miscarriage because the
fetus was already in the process of being born and, therefore, no
miscarriage was being procured. So, if prior to 1929 you were to crush
the skull of a baby in the process of being born, no offense was
committed. The 1929 Act was introduced to criminalize killing at that
point in the fetus' development, but, as it eventually emerged from the
legislative process, the crime was actually defined in a way that afforded
protection earlier than that point in its development. Child destruction

24. See Kennedy, The Legal and Ethical Implications of Postcoital Birth Control, in POSTCOITAL
CONTRACEPTION: METHODS, SERVICES AND PROSPECTS 62 (H. Grahame ed. 1983).

25. See the written answer by the then Attorney General, Sir Michael Havers Q.C. at 42 Parl.
Deb. H.C. 238, 239. See also Kennedy supra note 24.
26. Arguably, this is what occurs in the case of IUDs (intra-uterine devices) and the recently
developed French "abortion pill," RU 486. See Cahill, "Abortion Pill" RU 486: Ethics, Rhetoric
and Social Practice, 17 HASTINOS CENTER REPORT vol. 5, at 5 (1987).

27. See the statement of Lord Darling, who introduced the Bill, in the House of Lords at
71 Parl. Deb. H.L. 617-18 (1928).
28. A child had to be "born alive" and have "an existence independent of its mother." See
the case law cited by P. QE0Go, LAW, ETHCS AND MEDICINE 3 (1984).
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requires (1) an intent to kill a child, (2) that is capable of being born
alive, and (3) before it has an existence independent of its mother.
There is a significant overlap between the offenses of child destruction
and procuring a miscarriage. Aborting a fetus "capable of being born
alive" may amount to an offense under both sections because it is just
as much a miscarriage later on in the pregnancy as it is early on. But,
of course, it will not be child destruction unless the child has reached
the point of "being capable of being born alive." So procuring an
abortion of a mature fetus may amount to an offense under both
statutes. Procuring the abortion of a young fetus, which is not "capable
of being born alive," would only be an offense under section 58 of
the 1861 Act.
Why is it important to distinguish between liability under section 58
of the OAPA 1861 and under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929?
The answer lies in the circumstances where an offense under these.
provisions is justified and hence determines the scope of a lawful
abortion. The circumstances where a miscarriage may be procured and
a child capable of being born alive may be killed are different. Figure
2 sets out the position.
The Defenses
Grounds for
Abortion Under the
Abortion Act 1967
(S.58 OAPA liability)
Preserving the
Life of the
<-

Mother (1929 Act

->

liability)
Conception

Implantation

Viability

Birth

(Figure 2)
As this shows, the grounds of abortion (which we will return to) set
out in the Abortion Act 1967 only provide a defense to the crime of
procuring a miscarriage under section 58. As we shall see, these grounds
are liberal in their scope. But, they have no application to the crime
of child destruction under the 1929 Act. Section 5(1) of the Abortion
Act 1967 states that "[niothing in this Act shall affect the provisions
of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (protecting the life of the
viable fetus)." If we now look at the 1929 Act we see that the only
justification for committing the offense of child destruction is if the
child is killed "in good faith for the purpose only of.preserving the
'29
life of the mother.

29. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, proviso to § 1(1).
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So it follows that except in the case where the abortion is performed
to preserve the life of a mother, which is the defense to child destruction,
it is only lawful to perform an abortion if one of the Abortion Act
grounds is satisfied. In other words, the outer limits of lawful abortion,
except in this exceptional case of preserving the life of a mother, turns
on the point at which the 1929 Act and crime of child destruction
applies, that is, when a child is capable of being born alive. So we
have to ask ourselves the critical question, when is a child "capable
of being born alive?"
A number of interpretations of the 1929 Act are possible.3 0 First, it
could be construed to criminalize the killing of an unborn child only
at the time of birth. This, as we have seen, 3' was the purpose behind
the Act when it was introduced into Parliament. The plain wording of
the Act makes this construction quite impossible.3 2 The second interpretation of the 1929 Act would provide protection to the fetus which
is capable of surviving or, in other words, is viable. The third interpretation would protect the even less well developed fetus which was
literally, in the words of the statute, "born alive" as opposed to stillborn. Evidencing discernible signs of life would suffice. As must be
clear, these three interpretations afford protection to a fetus at progressively earlier points in its development. Consequently, these interpretations progressively narrow the scope for therapeutic abortions unless
done for life-saving reasons. Perhaps, not surprisingly, which of the
latter interpretations is correct has been a matter of controversy and
writers have argued for both interpretations. 3 The courts considered
34
this issue for the first time in 1987 in the case of C v. S.
An Oxford University undergraduate became pregnant after an affair
with another student. She decided that she was going to have an abortion
after the relationship broke down. The male student (they were not
married) sought to obtain an injunction from the court to prevent his
girlfriend from having an abortion. The case raises the issue of whether
there is any possibility of a paternal injunction in England to stop an

30. Keown, The Scope of the Offence of Child Destruction, 104 L.Q. REV. 120 (1988).
31. See supra note 27.
32. The long title of the 1929 Act states that the legislation is "[a]n Act to amend the law
with regard to the destruction of children at or before birth." Also, the presumption created in
section 1(2) that a 28 week old fetus is "capable of being born alive" does not sit easily with
a law only intended to cover the killing of a fetus at such a late stage of pregnancy that it is
in the process of delivery. Strangely, Macnaghten J. in R v. Bourne [1939] 1 K.B. 686, 691,
accepted counsel's argument that the Act "provides for the case where a child is killed by a
wilful act at the time when it is being delivered in the ordinary course of nature .... " [emphasis
added].
33. Tunkel, Abortion: How early, how late, and how legal?, 2 B.M.J. 253 (1979) (second
interpretation); Wright, The Legality of Abortion by Prostoglandin, 1984 CRIM. L. REV. 347
(third interpretation); Wright, Capable of Being Born Alive?, 131 NEw L.J. 188 (1981) (third
interpretation); Tunkel, Late Abortions and the Crime of Child Destruction: A Reply, 1985 CRtM.
L. REV. 133 (second interpretation); Wright, A Rejoinder, 1985 CRIM. L. REv. 140 (third interpretation).
34. [1988] 1 Q.B. 135 (Heilbron, J. and Court of Appeal). See also Rance v. Mid-Down HA,
140 NEw L.J. 325 (1990).
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abortion being performed." But for our purposes, the interesting point
in this case is that part of the father's argument to support his application
was that since the fetus was about eighteen weeks old, it was a child
"capable of being born alive" within the meaning of the 1929 Act.
Hence, even if one of the Abortion Act grounds, which we'll see are
quite liberal, was satisfied, this abortion was a criminal offense, because
it was not being done to preserve the life of the mother.
The trial judge, Heilbron J., dismissed C's application because of
his inability to establish sufficient locus standi to seek an injunction.
On appeal, the court did not address this issue.3 6 Instead, the Court
of Appeal considered whether it could be shown that the fetus was
within the protection of the 1929 Act. If it could not, then C conceded
that he was not entitled to an injunction. Counsel for C 7 argued that
the proper interpretation of the 1929 Act was that it prevented the
destruction of any fetus which showed "recognisable signs of life" even
if the fetus was not yet viable. Literally, perhaps, this interpretation is
plausible. The statute speaks of a fetus which if born would be "alive."
Further, there is a considerable body of case law which suggests that
once a fetus is delivered and is, in the words of the judges in those
cases "born alive," killing such a fetus will be homicide even if it lacks
the capacity to survive.3 8
The Court of Appeal rejected this approach. First, the court noted
that expert evidence had been produced by both sides on the interpretation of the phrase but, as one might expect, there was a difference
of opinion. Sir John Donaldson, M.R. concluded that this did not
matter since the proper interpretation of the phrase "capable of being
born alive" was a legal issue for the court. Secondly, the court observed
that the evidence supported the view that a fetus of eighteen to twentyone weeks gestation would not have the capacity to survive, because
its lungs would be insufficiently developed. Thirdly, Sir John Donaldson,
M.R. stated:
we have no evidence of the state of the fetus being carried by [S],
but if it has reached the normal stage of development and so is
incapable ever of breathing, it is not in our judgment "a child
capable of being born alive" within the meaning of the Act.3 9

The Court of Appeal's conclusive rejection of the most far reaching
interpretation of section 1(1) of the 1929 Act (and hence limiting effect

35. The answer provided by this case and the earlier case of Paton v. BPAS [19791 Q.B.
276, supra note 14, is that paternal injunctions will not be granted. See the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in Daigle v. Tremblay [19891 2 S.C.R.
_.
36. For a discussion of the locus standi issue, see Grubb and Pearl, Protecting the Life of
the Unborn Child, 103 L.Q. REV. 340 (1987). Even if it could be said that the father had locus
standi, it is evident that English law generally does not allow a private citizen to enforce the
criminal law by seeking an injunction in civil proceedings. This would have been a conclusive
argument against C. See Gouriet v. UPOW [19781 A.C. 435.
37. Leading Counsel for C was Mr. Gerard Wright Q.C., the author of a number of the
articles cited in note 33 supra.
38. See cases referred to by Atkinson, Life, Birth and Live Birth, 20 L.Q. REV. 134 (1904)
and Davies, Child-Killing in English Law, I MOD. L. REV. 203, 269 (1937).
39. C v. S 11988] Q.B. at 151.
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for therapeutic abortions) means that the ambit of the Act is restricted
to the protection of a fetus which has the capacity to survive, whether
naturally or by reasonable artificial means. In other words, only the
viable fetus is protected. 40 At present it seems that a fetus reaches
viability at around 24 weeks of gestation. 41 Prior to this, proof of
viability is difficult. As the evidence in C v. S showed, not until around
twenty-one weeks does the fetus develop lungs, and hence the capacity
to breathe. Nothing short of the development of an artificial womb
seems likely to push back the frontier of viability before this point in
fetal development. Between twenty-one and twenty-four weeks maturity,
proof of viability may be difficult but is not, perhaps, impossible.
One final point on C v. S. It puts to rest the medical profession's
often assumed position that legal abortion in England is permissible up
to twenty-eight weeks development. The assumption is based upon section
1(2) of the 1929 Act, which creates a presumption that at twenty-eight
weeks development a fetus is "capable of being born alive" i.e., viable.
This is only a presumption which relieves the prosecution of the burden
of proving viability at twenty-eight weeks. It does not, as the medical
profession assumed, prevent proof that a particular fetus was viable at
an earlier stage of its development.
Let me show you some of the figures about how many abortions,
as a percentage of abortions performed, we are talking about.
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ABORTIONS
BY WEEKS OF GESTATION

Year
[RESIDENTS]
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
[NON-RESIDENTS]
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

8 Weeks
or Less

9 - 12
Weeks

13 - 16
Weeks

17 Weeks
or More

24.7
31.2
32.5
34.5
35.1

57.4
53.8
53.2
51.0
51.0

13.1
10.7
09.9
10.1
09.4

4.8
4.3
4.4
4.4
4.5

20.4
26.4
28.9
28.9
28.7

47.4
43.8
40.9
41.3
40.0

20.9
17.1
16.4
16.3
16.4

11.3
12.7
13.8
13.5
14.8

(Table 1)

(Based upon figures in The Guttmacher Institute Report,

INDUCED ABORTiON,

A WOR.D RiviEw 1986, 6th ed.)

40. Abortion Act 1967, § 5(l), refers to the 1929 Act parenthetically as "protecting the life
of the viable foetus."
41. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNAECOLOGISTS, BRITISH PAEDIATRIC ASsoCIATION, ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PRACTITIONERS, ROYAL COLLEGE OF MIDWIVES, BRITISH
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT ON FOETAL
VIABILITY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (1985).
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This table is divided into weeks of gestation and residents and nonresidents. Because of England's quite liberal abortion law, we have a
lot of visitors from abroad seeking abortions; that is, the non-resident
category-people from countries which have less liberal laws than we
do. You will see, of course (and this is a percentage total), that very
few abortions are performed beyond twelve weeks in England. 86.1%
of abortions in 1984 and 85.507o in 1983 were performed prior to twelve
weeks of pregnancy. So, the issue about when is an abortion lawful in
England, is really determined by the law that applies to relatively
immature fetuses, and not as we now know the mature, viable fetus,
when the law would only allow abortions to preserve the life of the
mother. Perhaps at this point another set of statistics will help to put
the issue in perspective.
OFFENDERS FOUND GUILTY OR CAUTIONED

Year
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
1979
1978
1977
1976
1975
1974
1973
1972
1971
1970
1969
1968
1967

Child
Destruction
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Illegal
Abortion
2
4
1
3
5
0
4
3
5
1
17
11
48
54
55
72
69
71

(Table 2)
(Compiled from the Criminal Statistics for England and Wales)
If we look at Table 2 we see the number of individuals cautioned
by the police or found guilty by a court of the offenses of child
destruction and procuring a miscarriage during the years 1967-1984.
Quite clearly the number of illegal abortions is greater than those of
child destruction, the latter, of course, is virtually non-existent. Equally,
we see a marked decrease in the number of cases of illegal abortions
shortly after the Abortion Act came into force in 1968. By 1973, the
figures had dropped from seventy-one in 1967 to eleven. The current
trend is for the number of cases to be in single figures. It seems that
looking at these figures and the. earlier ones concerning gestational age
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in Table I that in practical terms we are really concerned with abortions
early in pregnancy and not later on approaching the point of viability.
If we have determined the outer limits of therapeutic abortion, remembering always that after viability only life threatening abortions are
permissible, it is to the scope of therapeutic abortions before viability
that we should turn our gaze. Two periods in the history of the English
law will help us understand what our law is today. First of all, there
is the law prior to the Act of 1967. That is helpful because the Act
builds upon the prior law. Secondly, of course, the law that now governs
England, Wales and Scotland is the 1967 legislation. At common law,
the offense of procuring a miscarriage under the ancient statute, contained no defense. There. was, on the face of it, no justification for
performing an abortion. If you procured a miscarriage, you were guilty
of an offense. However, the statute talks about "unlawfully" procuring
a miscarriage. The reasonable deduction from that might be that some
acts, done with the intent to procure a miscarriage, may not be unlawful.
There may be lawful ones and there may be unlawful ones.
In 1938 in R v. Bourne,42 the court recognized for the first time that
that word "unlawfully" did have a meaning and that a doctor might
lawfully perform some abortions, notwithstanding the apparent absolute
prohibition in the legislation. Bourne was an obstetric surgeon with a
cause. He performed an abortion on a fourteen year-old girl who had
been violently raped by a group of soldiers in London. And he was
charged with procuring a miscarriage under section 58 of the 1861
statute. He brought the prosecution upon himself because he wrote to
the Attorney General asking to be prosecuted so that he could test the
law. Fortunately, for him, he was acquitted.4 3 He was tried at the Old
Bailey in London. The judge, Mr. Justice Macnaghten, directed the
jury that the presence of the word "unlawful" in the legislation preventing the procurement of a miscarriage, was not meaningless and that
the scope of a lawful abortion could be equated with the scope of a
lawful act under the 1929 Act creating the offense of child destruction.
The scope of a lawful act which results in death of a child "capable
of being born alive," is where it is done for preserving the life of the
mother. A doctor could act lawfully, he said, in performing an abortion,
because it was nonsense to say it was lawful after the fetus was viable
if it was not also lawful in the same circumstances when the fetus was
less mature. If the doctor acted in good faith for the purposes of
preserving the life of the mother, he committed no offense under either
statute.
Thus far, of course, the scope of therapeutic abortion is narrow,
since rarely, in the ordinary case of abortion, will it be done to preserve
the life of the mother. But the judge in the Bourne case adopted a

42. 119391 1 K.B. 687.
43. An account of the trial can be found in Davies, The Law of Abortion and Necessity, 2
MOD. L. REV. 126 (1938).
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much more expansive interpretation of what preserving the life of the
mother meant. First he observed that he had great difficulty with the
distinction between preserving the life of the mother, and preserving
the health of the mother, which is the distinction the-prosecution sought
to make. As he put it, "life depends upon health, and it may be that
health is so gravely impaired that death results."" Consequently, he
4
interpreted the words as follows:

I think those words ought to be construed in a reasonable sense,
and, if the doctor is of opinion on reasonable grounds and with
adequate knowledge, that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy will be to make the woman a physical wreck,
the jury are quite entitled to take the view that the doctor who,
under those circumstances and in that honest belief, operates, is
operating for the purpose of preserving the life of the mother.
This exposition of the scope of a lawful therapeutic abortion is wider
than the natural meaning of the statutory phrase "preserving the life
of the mother," quite clearly. But not that wide, because he talks about
it making the mother a physical wreck as a result of giving-birth to
the child. Nevertheless the judge's view was accepted generally as the
law in England. Indeed, in the two cases that followed, the judges
extended the scope of a lawful therapeutic abortion even more widely,
explicitly recognizing that a doctor could perform an abortion to preserve
the physical or mental health of the woman.4 They expanded what Mr.
Justice Macnaghten had said in the Bourne case. While therapeutic
abortion was now part of English law, the English law itself provided
no regulation of abortion, since the only regulation was the crude
instrumentality of the criminal law, and the possibility of a defense to
it. The regulation of abortion in England only came in the Abortion
Act 1967.47 That Act was introduced by a private member of Parliament.
In other words, it was not a Government bill-it was sponsored by a
private member, David Steel, who was later to become the leader of
the Liberal Party. This legislation confirmed the medicalization of abortion in England and it remains unamended twenty-three years later,
even though there have been a dozen or so attempts to change it.48

44. [19391 1 K.B. at 692.
45. Id. at 693-94.
46. In R v. Bergmann and Ferguson [19481 1 B.M.J. 1008, Morris, J.rejected Macnaghten,
J.'s view that the doctor's belief should be "reasonable" and, instead, required a jury to focus
on the "honesty" of the doctor's belief. Consequently, as Morris, J.pointed out, the jury was
not concerned with whether the doctor had made a mistake. In R v. Newton and Stungo, 1958
Crim L.R. 469, Ashworth, J. made it quite clear that a doctor could perform an abortion to
preserve the health as well as the life of the mother. But he went further and added "When I
say health I mean not only her physical health but also her mental health."
47. The Act came into force on April 27, 1968. For the background of the Act, see CoMMrrrEE
ON ThE WORXING OF TH
ABORTION ACT, First Report, 1974, Cmnd No. 5579, at 1 16-28
(hereafter "Lane Report"). See also J.KEOWN, supra note 13, at ch. 4.
48. For a discussion of seven of the Bills introduced into Parliament between 1969 and 1979,
see J.KEOWN, supra note 13. at ch. 6.
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The Act replaces the common law.4 9 When a therapeutic abortion is
performed, the Act provides a defense only to the crime of procuring
a miscarriage. The 1967 Act has the following effects: First, it imposes
certain regulatory conditions on the performance of abortions. For
example, it specifies who may perform them, 0 where they may be
performed,5 and it imposes reporting requirements through regulations
made under the Act by the Minister of Health.12 Second, it creates the
circumstances-and this is perhaps more important-in which a lawful
abortion may be performed.
The statute is quite complicated so I have tried to simplify it in this
diagram.
GROUNDS FOR ABORTION UNDER 1967 ACT

1. MATERNAL MEDICAL (HEALTH) GROUND [s.l(1)(a)]
Risk to Mother's Life!
If pregnancy continues
Physical Health/
than if terminated
Mental Health

2. FAMILIAL MEDICAL (HEALTH) GROUND [s.1(1)(a)]
Risk to Existing Children
If pregnancy continues
of Family's Physical Health/
than if terminated
Mental Health
3. FETAL ABNORMALITY GROUND [s.l(l)(b)]
Substantial risk of (a) Physical or (b) Mental abnormality at birth = serious
handicap.
(Figure 3)
As Figure 3 shows, there are three grounds for abortion in the United
Kingdom (excluding Northern Ireland). In each case the pregnancy must
be terminated by a doctor," either in a National Health Service hospital,
and, of course, that will be a free abortion, or in a private clinic which
has been licensed by the government for that purpose. " The abortion
can only be performed if two doctors certify that a ground for abortion
exists."

49. Section 5(2) provides: "For the purposes of the law relating to abortion, anything done
with intent to procure the miscarriage of a woman is unlawfully done unless authorised by section
I of this Act."
50. Abortion Act 1967, § l(1).
51. Id.
52. Id. § 1(3).
53. Id. § 3(l). In Royal College of Nursing of the U.K. v. D.H.S.S. [1981] I A.C. 800, a
majority of the House of Lords held that a termination of pregnancy could be a team effort.
The court held that a termination using prostoglandin to induce a miscarriage was lawful providing
three conditions were satisfied: (i) the treatment was prescribed by a registered medical practitioner;
(ii) the registered medical practitioner remained in charge; (iii) the procedure was carried out
under his direction by qualified nursing staff and this was in accordance with accepted medical
practice.
54. Abortion Act 1967, § 1(3).
55. Id. § 1(1).
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Let us now turn to the grounds themselves. The first one is the one
I have called the maternal health ground. That justifies the termination
of the pregnancy if the risk to the mother's life or health (physical or
mental) would be greater if the pregnancy continues than if it were
terminated. I will return to this ground shortly and explain how that
works in practice. The second one is perhaps a more remarkable ground.
It is what I call the familial health ground, which justifies abortion if
the risk to the physical or mental health of any existing children of
the family would be greater if the mother's pregnancy were continued
than if it were terminated. Finally, the third ground, the fetal abnormality
ground, justifies abortion in the case where there is a substantial risk
that the baby when born would suffer from physical or mental abnormalities amounting to a serious handicap.
In two respects the Act goes further than the common law. It permits
an abortion even if there is no medical risk to the mother. That is the
second of the grounds, where there is a risk to the existing children
of the family. This must be seen as a significant liberalization of the
grounds of abortion since it does not have its origins at all in the
respect for the rights or interests of the mother, but of someone else.
Consequently that second ground has been the target of the pro-life
MPs when they have been trying to amend the Act by trying to abolish
the ground completely. 6 Also, the Act goes further than the common
law in the third ground-the fetal abnormality ground. It is the first
explicit recognition of an abortion where you will have a handicapped
child. Under the common law the courts had never recognized that,
although if you think carefully, it is not too difficult to say that there
may be some effect on the mental health of the woman if she knows
she is going to have a severely handicapped baby. But, that had never
been tested before the Act. 7
We should put aside, I think, the discussion of the fetal abnormality
ground, it is relatively straightforward, and look at the other two. The
other two are the grounds under which the vast majority of abortions
are performed. The following table is compiled from data in the Lane
Report of 197411 which reported on the working of the Act. It shows
the total number of reported abortions performed under the three
grounds during the years 1968-1971. It also represents the number of
abortions under each ground as a percentage of the total number of
abortions performed.

56. For example, David Alton's Abortion (Amendment) Bill 1988.
57. The view has been expressed that such situations were covered by the common law. See
[19561 2 B.M.J. 821 (mother infected with rubella during pregnancy) and Lord Denning speaking
in the House of Lords in the debate on Lord Silkin's Abortion Bill in 1965, 270 PARL. DEB.
H.L. 1183 (mother who had taken the tetragenic drug, thalidomide, during pregnancy).
58. Supra note 47.
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Maternal Health (1)
Familial Health (2)
Fetal Abnormality (3)
(1) and (3)
(2) and Another

[Vol. 20

1968
18,067
76.40

1969
41,806
76.30o

1970
68,471
79.2%

1971
99,376
78.40o

957
4.0%
906
3.807o
442
1.806
3,228

2,294
4.20o
1,118
2.007o
828
1.5 %
8,728

3,524
4.1Oo
1,248
1.4o
906
1.0%
12,370

4,220
3.3%To
1,375
1.1°o
1,108
0.9%
20,676

14.3%

16.30o

13.7616
15.907o
(Table 3)

As these figures show, the maternal health ground accounted for over
7507o of all abortions in the period 1968-1971. The familial health ground,
whether alone or together with another ground, represented between 10
and 20% of the remaining 2507o of abortions that were performed. The
fetal abnormality ground, taken alone, was relied upon in a very small
percentage of instances, between 3.807o at the highest in 1968 and 1.107o
at the lowest in 1971.1 9 Consequently, we can observe the following
about abortion practice in England. First, most abortions are performed
early in pregnancy and secondly, most abortions are justified on the
maternal health ground or, but to a lesser extent, the familial health
ground. The Act does not authorize an abortion merely on the basis
of a risk to the mother or her children-the maternal or familial health
grounds. Instead it requires a comparison of risks between the status
quo of pregnancy and the situation if the pregnancy is terminated.
There is a balancing of risks to be done.
On the face of it, the 1967 Act does not permit a doctor to perform
an abortion whenever a consenting adult woman requests one and the
doctor is willing to perform it. In this respect it could be argued that
the English law is more restrictive than American law during the first
trimester, as long, of course, as Roe v. Wade survives. There are, it
could be argued, significant restrictions in England on abortions, even
when performed early in pregnancy. First, there must be medical grounds
for it. The social conditions of the mother alone appear not to suffice.
There has to be a greater risk to her mental or physical health or to
her children's mental or physical health by being pregnant than by
having an abortion.

59. There is one further ground for abortion not discussed in the text and this is where it
is carried out in an emergency to save the life of the pregnant woman or to prevent grave
permanent injury to her physical or mental health. See 1967 Act § 1(4). This emergency ground
is not discussed because it rarely arises. The figures for 1968 to 1971 show that it was relied
upon in 0.3% and 0.106 of cases in 1968 and 1969. In 1970 and 1971 the number of cases was
less than 0.1076.
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Secondly, the comparative exercise imposed upon the doctors is a
limitation. A doctor can not simply act because he thinks there is a
risk to her health. He has to ask, is the risk worse if I let this pregnancy
continue than if I terminate it? In fact, neither of these imposes any
real obstacle in the relationship between the doctor and his pregnant
patient in England. Abortions, at least ones performed early in pregnancy, are available on request. 0 We can examine this in the light of
some figures dealing with the numbers of abortions performed in England
and Wales. Table 4 shows the figures between 1961 and 1984.
TOTAL NUMBER OF ABORTIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968

14,300
16,800
16,600
18,300
19,500
21,400
27,200
23,600

1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984

34,800
86,600
126,800
159,900
167,100
162,900
139,700
129,700
133,000
141,600
149,700
160,900
162,500
163,000
162,200
170,000

PRE-ABORTION ACT

POST-ABORTION ACT

(Table 4)

(Based upon figures in The Guttmacher Institute Report,
A

WORLD

INDUCED ABORTION,

REvIEW 1986, 6th ed.)

If we look at these figures, we see that the number of abortions performed
in England and Wales in 1984 was 170,000. Today's figures would be
roughly the same being somewhere between 170,000 and 180,000 per
year. The table shows the considerable increase in the number of abortions

60. Ormrod, A Lawyer's Look at Medical Ethics, 46 MED.-LEGAL J. 18, 21-22 (1978); Royal
College of Nursing of the United Kingdom v. D.H.S.S. [19811 A.C. 800, 803 (Lord Denning

M.R.).
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performed after the 1967 Act came into force. We should not be misled
by this. Clearly, the number of abortions performed did increase but
undoubtedly, the pre-Act figures are depressed - for two reasons. Many
back-street abortions took place before the Act and these, obviously,
went unreported. Also, others which were performed were not necessarily
reported since the requirement that performance of an abortion be
reported to the central authorities was only introduced by the 1967 Act.
The significant rise from 23,600 to 34,000; 23,600 in the first year
after the Act, going up to 126,000 in the fourth year, which is an
increase of between five and six times in three years, may not be a true
reflection of the increase. But, nevertheless, you can see that doctors
appear to carry out abortions relatively more frequently now under the
Act. We see a peak in the middle of 167,000 in 1973 and a gradual
dropping off and then a gradual increase in the 1980s.
A number of reasons can be given why it appears that abortion "on
request" (some would call it abortion "on demand," but I would rather
it be described as "on request") exists in England. The first is that the
two grounds, that is the maternal and familial health grounds, look to
the risks to the health of the mother or her children. What we mean
by health may be very wide indeed. The World Health Organization,
for example, defines health as being the state of complete mental, physical6
and social well-being, and not merely an absence of disease or infirmity.
Consequently a risk to health, particularly mental health, may often
exist if a pregnancy is unwanted. Once health is not restricted to physical
health, then the doctors are given considerable scope and discretion to
be satisfied that the abortion is justified, either under the ground of
maternal health interests or familial health interests. The Act is, I think,
more liberal in its approach to abortion, than the common law was
after Bourne in the sense that the doctors are allowed to look at familial
health and they can interpret health wider than, I think, the judges
would have allowed at common law.
While it is doubtful whether social factors alone, financial or otherwise,
are sufficient to justify an abortion under the Act-and that was true
at common law-their existence might support a doctor's conclusion that
the mental health of the pregnant woman or an existing child would be
put at risk by the continuance of the pregnancy. Indeed the Act permits
a doctor to make this very deduction when it states that account may
be taken of the pregnant woman's "actual or reasonably foreseeable
environment. ' 62 Hence the social circumstances of the mother and her
already existing children may easily lead a doctor to conclude that there
is a risk to her or their mental health. Would this, for example-I just
pose the question-justify an abortion performed on a mother who,
because of cultural pressures would prefer not to have a child of a

61. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, BASIC DOCUMENTS (26th ed. 1976).
62. Abortion Act 1967, § 1(2).

Summer 19901

ABORTION LAW

particular sex? 63 In the non-resident category, performed in private health
clinics, that is quite a common situation apparently. There may be a
very fine line between social and cultural pressure and consequential
psychological impact that would bring such a case within the liberal
terms of the Act, however abhorrent we might think it is to have an
abortion on grounds of sex selection. Also, the mother whose financial
circumstances are such that one more child would lead to hardship for
her or her children, or the mother whose business or university career
might be ruined by an unwanted child, indeed any mother whose social
circumstances may significantly worsen with the birth of a child, may
well establish the maternal or if appropriate, familial medical grounds
under the Act. Even though the doctors have to certify under the Act
that the risk is greater if the pregnancy is continued than if its terminated,
that comparative exercise really presents no obstacle. Modern medical
techniques make abortion a very safe procedure when performed early
in pregnancy." Consequently, the medical risks in performing an abortion
are not very great when weighed on the scales against the risks that
may exist if the pregnancy is continued, like the maternal death rate. 65
It seems likely that a doctor can conclude that it is more dangerous to
be pregnant than to have a pregnancy terminated early on." The risks
involved in early abortions by vacuum aspiration,6 7 for example, are
lower than the risks that a mother necessarily undergoes by being pregnant." It is statistically safer not to be pregnant, is the truth of the
matter, when you are very early on in your pregnancy.
If you recall, the vast majority of these abortions are performed very
early on, within the first twelve weeks of the pregnancy. Hence, this is
where the notion of abortion "on request" comes from, because the
doctor can almost always statistically say it is safer for a woman not
to be pregnant at that stage of the pregnancy.
Once it is accepted that the 1967 Act gives the medical profession
wide discretion in determining when an abortion may be performed, the
remaining question is to what extent will the courts subject to review
the exercise of that discretion by the doctors certifying that the grounds
for an abortion are satisfied? Since the grounds of abortion require only

63. Morgan, Fetal Identification, Abortion and the Law, 18

64. See Lane Report, supra note 47, at

1 94-159 and

FAM.

L. 355 (1988).

ABORTION: MEDICAL PROGRESS AND

SOCIAL IMPLICATION (R. Porter & M. O'Connor, eds. 1985) especially pp. 67-101.

65. Between 1970-1978 there were 59 deaths from legal abortions, a rate of 48.2 deaths per

million abortions. DEPARTMENT OF
ENQUIRIES INTO MATERNAL DEATH IN

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT ON CONFIDENTIAL
ENGLAND AND WALES 1976-78 (1982) (hereinafter DHSS 1982

Report).

66. For a discussion of the so-called "statistical argument." see G.
(2d ed. 1983) 299.

WILLIAMS,

TEXTBOOK OF

CIMINAL LAW

67. After 12 weeks gestation a variety of methods of abortion are utilized, in descending
order of use they are: dilation and curettage, induced abortion (usually with prostaglandins), and
hysterectomy.
68. Vacuum aspiration is the method of choice for abortions up to 12 weeks. The DHSS 1982
Report, supra note 65, noted nine deaths in the years 1970-1978, which is a rate of 13.2 deaths
per million.
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that the doctor form, in good faith, a belief that one of those three
grounds exists, the limits on the court's role must be to determine6 9the
honesty of the doctor, because good faith is all that is necessary. It
is not necessary under the Act for the risk to be greater in continuing
the pregnancy than terminating it, just that the doctors in good faith
believe that. Hence, doctors are not subject to any judicial control
70
outside of cases of patent dishonesty by them in forming that conclusion.
The judicial attitude can be seen in Paton v. British Pregnancy Advisory
Service. 71 A husband sought an injunction to prevent his wife from
obtaining an abortion without his consent. The provisions of the 1967
Act were complied with and the necessary certificate was given by two
doctors. Sir George Baker P. refused the husband's application for an
injunction on the grounds that he lacked locus standi either on his own
behalf or on behalf of the unborn child. It was not argued that the
abortion did not comply with the terms of the 1967 Act. However Baker
P. observed that "it would be quite impossible for the courts to supervise
the operation of the Abortion Act 1967. . . .[A] great social responsibility
'72
is firmly placed by the law on the shoulders of the medical profession.
The judicial reluctance to become involved in challenges to a doctor's
discretion under the Act was reiterated by the judge later in his judg7
ment :
This certificate is clear, and not only would it be a bold and brave
judge . . .who would seek to interfere with the discretion of doctors
acting under the [Abortion Act 1967], but I think he would be a
really foolish judge who would try to do any such thing, unless
possibly, where there is clear and bad faith and an obvious attempt
to perpetrate a criminal offence.
These remarks were subsequently approved in the Court of Appeal by
Sir John Donaldson M.R. in C v. S, decided in 1987.14 There can be
little doubt that the English judiciary has no desire to challenge, except
in the most exceptional circumstances, the medical decision-making power
conferred upon doctors by the Abortion Act 1967.
Outside of jury trial for a criminal offense based upon the dishonesty
of the doctor that one of these grounds exists, the decision-making
process is handed to the doctor by the English abortion law. Hence I
think I can generalize by saying we have a very liberal abortion lawcertainly early on in pregnancy-which differs little from the situation
under the Roe v. Wade trimester scheme during the first trimester.

69. E.g., R v. Smith [19741 1 All E.R. 376.
70. Another possibility would be if one of the pre-conditions under the Act are not satisfied.

See, e.g., id.
71. [1979] 1 Q.B. 276. See Kennedy, Husband Denied A Say in Abortion Decision, 42 MoD.
L.R. 324 (1979).

72. Id. at 281.
73. Id. at 282.
74. [19881 1 QB 135.
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Let me conclude by asking a few questions about the future. At a
time when state legislatures in the U.S. are going to be confronted, I
think, for the first time in fifteen years with the challenge of legislating
meaningfully on abortion, our situation in the U.K. may be similar.
First, pro-life groups will continue to seek to support members of
Parliament and will seek to continue to see bills introduced, either
attempting to restrict the upper limits of abortions and/or the grounds
of abortion. The lack of any success in achieving an amendment to the
1967 Act may encourage some pro-choice groups that the change will
not come in this way. I think it is unlikely-there are no votes to be
won by legislating on abortion in England. The Government is unlikely
to introduce any legislation which will fundamentally alter the 1967 Act.
The only way it can be amended and the way it has been attempted is
by an individual MP chancing his luck in the lottery of individual MP's
opportunities to introduce bills and get them through Parliament without
Government support. But, because they are not government sponsored,
there is a limited time for them to be discussed and so each of these
bills at some point or other has been talked out by the other side. 7"
One change that may come, is the reduction of the upper time limit
in the 1929 Act to twenty-four weeks. Interestingly, the Act presumes
a child to be capable of being born alive at twenty eight weeks, 76 so
that is sometimes taken by the medical profession to be the point of
viability. There has been a dbate suggesting that the time should be
brought down to the medical reality of twenty-four weeks.", And it is
likely that the government will do that, 7 but of course, that changes
nothing, since the Court of Appeal has already interpreted "capable of
being born alive," which is the point at which the 1929 Act makes it
criminal to destroy an unborn child, as arising before the presumption
of twenty-eight weeks, at an earlier point, somewhere around twentyfour or maybe a week or two earlier. 79 Even if the law changes, it would
not alter the situation.
A more significant risk of change may come from Europe. England
does not have any constitutional law of the sort that is all too familiar

75. This was the fate of the Corrie Bill in 1979 and the Alton Bill in 1988. The latter, which
commanded a majority of 45 at its Second Reading stage, see I Lancet 251 (1988), fell on May
6, 1988 because of filibustering tactics of its opponents at the committee stage. See I Lancet
1118 (1988). Further ploys, this time by Mr. Alton, to amend a Government Bill to add to
abortion provisions also subsequently failed. 1 Lancet 1175 (1988). The Bill introduced by Ann
Widdecombe MP in December of 1988 was co-sponsored by the defeated Mr. Alton and represents
in form his Bill which fell earlier in the year.
76. Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, § 1(1) proviso.
77. The Lane Report, supra note 47, at 11 274-83 recommended this change in 1974. It also
seems to have the universal support of the medical profession. See ROYAL COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS
AND GYNAEcOLOGISTS,
TIONERS,

BRITISH PAEDIATRIC ASSOCIATION,

ROYAL COLLEGE OF GENERAL PPACTI-

ROYAL COLLEGE OF MIDWIVES, BRITISH MEDICAL ASSOCIATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT ON FOETAL VIABILITY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE

(1985).
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to the American lawyer. But Europe does, and we are a part of it.
While the focus of English abortion law is properly directed towards
Parliament and not the judiciary, the scope for judicial review of abortion
law in England as a signatory to the European Convention on Human
Rights exists. The Convention is a European Bill of Rights. It explicitly
recognizes many of the rights, indeed more of the rights, than you have
explicit in your Bill of Rights. While it is not directly enforceable in
England, the English courts cannot overturn legislation on the strength
of it; the European Court of Human Rights sitting in Strasbourg has
the power to declare that the law of the United Kingdom, whether the
Common Law or the statutory law, infringes one of the rights spelt out
in the Convention. Such a declaration has no direct effect on the law
of England, but it requires the United Kingdom government to change
the law to conform with the ruling. There are some arguments that the
constitutional questions that you address in your constitutional law cases
on abortion, and Canada has done so under their Charter of Rights
and Freedoms,80 could equally lead to even our liberal abortion law
being struck down because of some of its limitations.
In Paton v. United Kingdom,"' a claim was brought against the United
Kingdom government arguing that English abortion law infringed the
Convention. Paton applied for an injunction in the English courts to
prevent his wife seeking and undergoing an abortion. His application
was refused. Before the European Commission of Human Rights, which
functions as a preliminary screening body for cases to go to the European
Court of Human Rights, Paton made a much larger claim than arguing
that a denial of an injunction infringed the "right to respect for his
...

family life" protected under Article 8.82 He claimed that a law

permitting abortion at all infringed the Convention. He relied on several
articles of the Convention but principally on Article 2 which provide
that "[elveryone's right to life shall be protected by law." This, he
claimed, applied to the unborn child and hence the fetus' "right to life"
would be infringed if an abortion was performed.
The Commission refused to decide whether the unborn child could be
brought within the term "everyone" in Article 2. However, the Commission gave a reasonably clear indication that it could not. The Commission was influenced by the context in which the term "everyone" is
used in the Convention. Specifically, looking at Article 2 itself, the right
in Article 2 is taken away in four situations: first, in the case of the
death penalty; secondly, on grounds of self-defense; thirdly, where a
lawful arrest is effected or an escaping prisoner is detained and fourthly,

80. Morgentaler v. R [1988] S.C.R. 30, discussed by Ziff, Abortion and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms [19891 C.L.J. 165.
81. [1980] 3 E.I.R.R. 408.
82. This argument was dismissed because the Commission held that Paton's rights under Article
8 had to be considered limited by his wife's rights as a pregnant woman carrying the fetus.
Therefore, interference with them was justified "as being necessary for the protection of the
rights of another person." Id. at 416.
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where a riot or insurrection is quelled. Each of these is clearly applicable
to individuals who had been born. Consequently, the Commission reasoned, this "tend[ed] to support the view that [Article 2] does not include
the unborn." 83
In any event the Commission determined that even if Article 2 applied,
an unborn child's "right to life" is limited by the rights of the pregnant
woman when an abortion is performed to protect her life or health.
Since this had been the ground for the abortion, Paton's claim was
denied by the Commission.
The Paton case cannot be the final word on the compatibility of
English abortion law with the Convention. The Commission's decision
is very narrowly expressed. First, Paton's wife had sought an abortion
when she was eight weeks pregnant. The Commission made it quite clear
that it was not concerned with balancing the rights of a mature fetus
with those of the mother for this was a case where the abortion arose
at the "initial stage of the pregnancy." If an unborn child did have
rights under Article 2, might a different balance be struck if the fetus
was twenty weeks old? Secondly, the Commission restricted its decision
to cases where there is a "medical indication" for the abortion in the
interests of the mother's life or health. The Commission specifically
excluded from its consideration abortions performed on, for example,
eugenic or social grounds. English law contemplates abortions-- being
lawfully performed in both these situations.
These caveats should not lead to the conclusion that English abortion
law is necessarily unlawfully wide in its scope. When pressed the Commission and the European Court of Human Rights may decide Article
2 does not apply to the unborn child. Canadian courts have consistently
held that this is the position under similar provisions in Canadian law. 8'
Also, there are provisions in the European Convention which support
an argument that a woman has a right to.an abortion, at least, in some
circumstances. Article .5 provides that "[e]veryone has the right to liberty
and security of person." This may protect the right of a woman to
seek an abortion in all, or some, situations. It certainly looks like an
effective foil to any assertion that an unborn child's rights are absolute.
A similar provision in section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms led the Canadian Supreme Court in the Morgentaler8l case to
strike down a restrictive abortion law because it did not give the pregnant
woman sufficient opportunity to obtain an abortion. Equally, a woman's
right to an abortion may be supported under Article 8 which protects
the "right to respect for [her] private and family life."

83. Id. at 413.
84. Dehler v. Ottawa Civic Hospital. 101 D.L.R.3d 686 (1979); Borowski v. The Attorney General
for Canada, 4 D.L.R.4th 112 (1987) (appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada dismissed on procedural
grounds 119891 1 S.C.R. 342). See also Daigle v. Tremblay (19891 2 S.C.R. -.
85. (19881 S.C.R. 30.
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It is perhaps something of an irony that the United Kingdom has had
legislative battles over abortion for over twenty years but the courts
have not been greatly involved. On the other hand, the history of the
last fifteen years in this country has been the converse, it has been the
courts and not the legislature which has seen the battles. Just at the
time when the U.S. battles may be returned to the elected legislatures,
the greatest threat to the compromise legislation that we have in the
1967 Act may indeed come from a court, not from our legislature-not
this time the court of national jurisdiction, but a court from abroad,
from Strasbourg, the European Court of Human Rights. Little seems
to be different on both sides of the Atlantic-just, it seems, reversed
in time.
POSTSCRIPT
As I indicated in my lecture (see footnote 78), it was likely that some
amendment to the abortion legislation would occur during the passage
of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill through Parliament.
The Bill creates a regulatory framework for the new reproductive techniques, but the Government introduced (and encouraged other) amendments to it dealing with abortion. On Monday, April 23, 1990, an
amendment to the abortion law was approved by the House of Commons.
Although the parliamentary process is not concluded, it is likely that
the substance of this amendment will survive and become law. The
amendment achieves the following.
First, it restricts reliance upon the familial health ground to pregnancies
which do not exceed twenty-four weeks. Secondly, it similarly restricts
reliance upon the maternal health ground unless the doctors consider
the risk to the mother's life is greater if the pregnancy continues than
if it is terminated or if the termination is necessary to prevent grave
permanent injury to her physical or mental health. In such cases, there
is no upper time limit.
In themselves, these amendments would not change the law significantly. Few abortions are performed after twenty-four weeks in any
event and, further, the courts' interpretation of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 probably results in post-twenty-four week abortions
being illegal under that Act. Consequently, it is the third change to the
law which is the most significant because the Abortion Act (section 5(1))
is amended to state that if a pregnancy is terminated in compliance with
the Abortion Act then no offense under the 1929 Act is committed.
Thus, there is no upper time limit restricting termination of pregnancy
on the fetal abnormality ground or the maternal health ground if there
is a risk to the mother's life or if it is necessary to prevent grave
permanent injury to her physical or mental health. In addition, an
abortion performed under the remainder of the maternal health ground
or the familial health ground before the end of the twenty-fourth week
of pregnancy will not be illegal under the 1861 Act or, importantly, the
1929 Act; even if the unborn child is "capable of being born alive" or
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viable. This undoubtedly literalises the law as stated by the Court of
Appeal in C. v. S.
The intention of the Government in permitting amendments to the
abortion law was, on the surface, to restrict the availability of abortions.
In fact, quite the opposite has occurred and the law is now even more
liberal than it was before.

